Abstract. We propose a new 128-bit blockcipher CLEFIA supporting key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits, which is compatible with AES. CLEFIA achieves enough immunity against known attacks and flexibility for efficient implementation in both hardware and software by adopting several novel and state-of-the-art design techniques. CLEFIA achieves a good performance profile both in hardware and software. In hardware using a 0.09 µm CMOS ASIC library, about 1.60 Gbps with less than 6 Kgates, and in software, about 13 cycles/byte, 1.48 Gbps on 2.4 GHz AMD Athlon 64 is achieved. CLEFIA is a highly efficient blockcipher, especially in hardware.
Introduction
A lot of secure and high performance blockciphers have been designed benefited from advancing research which started since the development of DES [11] . For example, IDEA, MISTY1, AES, and Camellia are fruits of such research activities [1, 10, 15, 19] . New design and evaluation techniques are evolved day by day; topics on algebraic immunity and related-key attacks are paid attention recently [6, 8] . Moreover, light-weight ciphers suitable for a very limited resource environment are still active research fields. FOX and HIGHT are examples of such newly developed blockciphers [12, 13] .
We think it is good timing to show a new blockcipher design based on current state-of-the-art techniques. In this paper, we propose a new 128-bit blockcipher CLEFIA supporting key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits, which are compatible with AES. CLEFIA achieves enough immunity against known cryptanalyses and flexibility for very efficient implementation in hardware and software. The fundamental structure of CLEFIA is a generalized Feistel structure consisting of 4 data lines, in which there are two 32-bit F-functions per one round.
One of novel design approaches of CLEFIA is that these F-functions employ the Diffusion Switching Mechanism (DSM) [22, 23] : they use different diffusion matrices, and two different S-boxes are used to obtain stronger immunity against a certain class of attacks. Consequently, the required number of rounds can be reduced. Moreover, the two S-boxes are based on different algebraic structures, which is expected to increase algebraic immunity. Other novel ideas include the secure and compact key scheduling design and the DoubleSwap function used in it. The key scheduling part uses a generalized Feistel structure, and it is possible to share it with the data processing part. The DoubleSwap function can be compactly implemented to enable efficient round key generation in encryption and decryption.
CLEFIA achieves about 1.60 Gbps with less than 6 Kgates in hardware using a 0.09 µm CMOS ASIC library, and about 13 cycles/byte, 1.48 Gbps on 2.4 GHz AMD Athlon 64 processor in software. We consider CLEFIA is a well-balanced blockcipher in security and performance, and the performance is advantageous among other blockciphers especially in hardware.
This paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, notations are first introduced. In Sect. 3, we give the specification of CLEFIA. Then design rationale is shown in Sect. 4. Sect. 5 describes the evaluation results on both of security and performance aspects. Finally Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
Notations
This section describes mathematical notations, conventions and symbols used throughout this paper. 0x : A prefix for a binary string in a hexadecimal form a (b) : b denotes the bit length of a a|b or (a|b) : Concatenation 
: For an 8n-bit string a = a 0 |a 1 | . . . |a n−1 , a i ∈ {0, 1} 8 , w b (a) denotes the number of non-zero a i s.
Definition of GFN d,r
CLEFIA uses a 4-branch and an 8-branch Type-2 generalized Feistel network [24] . Step 1.
Step 2. For i = 0 to r − 1 do the following:
Step 1.
Step 2.1
The inverse function GFN −1 d,r are realized by changing the order of RK i and the direction of word rotation at Step 2.2 and Step 3.
Data Processing Part
The data processing part of CLEFIA consists of ENC r for encryption and DEC r for decryption. ENC r and DEC r use a 4-branch generalized Feistel structure GFN 4,r . Let P, C ∈ {0, 1} 128 be a plaintext and a ciphertext, and let P i , C i ∈ {0, 1} 32 (0 ≤ i < 4) be divided plaintext and ciphertext where
32 be whitening keys and RK i ∈ {0, 1} 32 (0 ≤ i < 2r) be round keys provided by the key scheduling part. Then, r-round encryption function ENC r is defined as follows:
The decryption function DEC r is the inverse function of ENC r which is defined by using GFN −1 d,r . Fig. 1 in Appendix C illustrates the ENC r function. The number of rounds, r, is 18, 22 and 26 for 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit keys, respectively.
Key Scheduling Part
The key scheduling part of CLEFIA supports 128, 192 and 256-bit keys and outputs whitening keys WK i (0 ≤ i < 4) and round keys RK j (0 ≤ j < 2r) for the data processing part. We first define the DoubleSwap function which is used in the key scheduling part.
128 is defined as follows: (Generating LL, LR from KL, KR for a k-bit key)
Step 2.
Step 5 
Key Scheduling for a 256-bit Key. For a 256-bit key, the value of k is set as 256, and the steps are almost the same as in the 192-bit key case. The difference is that we use CON 
F-functions
Step 3. Let y = y0|y1|y2|y3, yi ∈ {0, 1} Two matrices M 0 and M 1 in Step 3 are defined as follows.
0x01 0x02 0x04 0x06 0x02 0x01 0x06 0x04 0x04 0x06 0x01 0x02 0x06 0x04 0x02 0x01
0x01 0x08 0x02 0x0a 0x08 0x01 0x0a 0x02 0x02 0x0a 0x01 0x08 0x0a 0x02 0x08 0x01
These are 4 × 4 Hadamard-type matrices with elements h ij = a i⊕j for a certain set {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } † . The multiplications between matrices and vectors are performed in GF(2 8 ) defined by the lexicographically first primitive polynomial 
Constant Values

32-bit constant values CON (k) i
are used in the key scheduling algorithm. We need 60, 84 and 92 constant values for 128, 192 and 256-bit keys, respectively. Let
, where e is the base of the natural logarithm (2.71828...) and π is the circle ratio (3.14159..
.). CON (k)
i , for k = 128, 192, 256, are generated by the following way (See Table 1 for the repetition numbers l (k) and the initial values IV (k) ).
Step
Step 2. For i = 0 to l (k) − 1 do the following:
Step 2.1. CON
In Step 2.3, multiplications are performed in GF(2 16 ) defined by a primitive polynomial z 16 
) † An Hadamard-type matrix is used in the blockcipher Anubis [2] . ‡ The lower 16-bit value is defined as 0xa831=(
16 . '101' is the smallest prime number satisfying the primitive polynomial condition in this form.
Design Rationale
CLEFIA is designed to realize good balance on three fundamental directions for practical ciphers: (1) security, (2) speed, and (3) cost for implementations. This section describes the design rationale of several aspects of CLEFIA.
Structure. CLEFIA employs a 4-branch generalized Feistel structure which is considered as an extension of a 2-branch traditional Feistel structure. There are many types of generalized Feistel structures. We choose one instance which is known as "Generalized type-2 transformations" defined by Zheng et al. [24] . The type-2 structure has two F-functions in one round for the four data lines case. The type-2 structure has the following features:
-F-functions are smaller than that of the traditional Feistel structure -Plural F-functions can be processed simultaneously -Tends to require more rounds than the traditional Feistel structure
The first feature is a great advantage for software and hardware implementations, and the second one is suitable for efficient implementation especially in hardware. We conclude that the advantages of the type-2 structure surpass the disadvantage of the third one for our blockcipher design. Moreover, the new design technique, which is explained in the next, enables to reduce the number of rounds effectively.
Diffusion Switching Mechanism. CLEFIA employs two different diffusion matrices to enhance the immunity against differential attacks and linear attacks by using the Diffusion Switching Mechanism (DSM). This design technique was originally developed for the traditional Feistel structures [22, 23] . We customized this technique suitable for GFN d,r , which is one of the unique propositions of this cipher. Due to the DSM, we can prevent difference cancellations and linear mask cancellations in the neighborhood rounds in the cipher. As a result the guaranteed number of active S-boxes is increased.
Let the branch number of a function P be B(P ) = min a =0 {w b (a)+w b (P (a))}. The two matrices M 0 and M 1 used in CLEFIA satisfy the following branch number conditions of the DSM. Table 2 shows the guaranteed numbers of active S-boxes of CLEFIA. The guaranteed data are obtained from computer simulations using a exhaustivetype search algorithm. Now we focus on the columns indexed by 'GFN 4,r '. The columns of 'D' and 'L' in the table show the guaranteed number of differential and linear active S-boxes, respectively. The 'DSM' denotes that the DSM is used, and the 'w/o DSM' denotes that DSM is not used, where only one matrix with branch number 5 is employed. From this table we can confirm the effects of the DSM when r ≥ 3, and these guaranteed numbers increase about 20% − 40% than the structure without DSM. Consequently, the numbers of rounds can be reduced, which implies that the performance is improved. Choices of two S-boxes. CLEFIA employs two different types of 8-bit Sboxes: one is based on four 4-bit random S-boxes, and the other is based on the inverse function over GF (2 8 ) which has the best possible maximum differential probability DP max and linear probability LP max . The both S-boxes are selected to be implemented efficiently especially in hardware. The two 8-bit S-boxes S 0 and S 1 are defined as:
S 0 is generated by combining four 4-bit S-boxes SS 0 , SS 1 , SS 2 and SS 3 in the following way. The values of these S-boxes are defined as Table 3 .
The multiplication in 0x2 · t i is performed in GF(2 4 ) defined by the lexicographically first primitive polynomial z 4 + z + 1. S 1 is defined as follows:
The inverse function is performed in GF(2 8 ) defined by a primitive polynomial
and g(·) are affine transformations over GF (2) , which are defined as follows.
f : x (8) → y (8) g : .00 , the minimum Boolean degree is 7 and it has at least 252 terms over GF (2 8 ).
Designs for Efficient Implementations. CLEFIA can be implemented efficiently both in hardware and software. In Table 4 , we summarize the design aspects for efficient implementations. 
Evaluations
Security
As a result of our security evaluation, full-round CLEFIA is considered as a secure blockcipher against known attacks. Here, we mention the cryptanalytic results of several attacks which are considered effective for reduced-round CLE-FIA.
Differential Cryptanalysis [7] . For differential attack, we adopt an approach to count the number of active S-boxes of differential characteristics. This method was adopted by AES, Camellia and other blockciphers [1, 10] . We found the guaranteed number of differential active S-boxes of CLEFIA by computer search as shown in Table 2 . Using 28 active S-boxes for 12-round CLEFIA and DP S0 max = 2 −4.67 , it is shown that DCP 12r max ≤ 2 28×(−4.67) = 2 −130.76 . This means there is no useful 12-round differential characteristic for an attacker. Moreover, since S 1 has lower DP max , the actual upper-bound of DCP is expected to be lower than the above estimation. As a result, we believe that full-round CLEFIA is secure against differential cryptanalysis.
Linear Cryptanalysis [17] . We also apply active S-boxes based approach for the evaluation of linear cryptanalysis. Since LP 40 . We conclude that it is difficult for an attacker to find 12-round linear-hulls which can be used to distinguish CLEFIA from a random permutation. As a result, full-round CLEFIA is secure enough against linear cryptanalysis. Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis [4] . We consider that impossible differential attack is one of the most powerful attacks against CLEFIA. The following two impossible differential paths are found.
32 is any non-zero difference. These paths are confirmed by the check algorithm proposed by Kim et al. [14] . Using the above distinguisher, we can mount actual key-recovery attacks for each key length. Table 5 shows the summary of the complexity required for the impossible differential attacks. According to Table 5 , it is expected that full-round CLEFIA has enough security margin against this attack. Saturation Cryptanalysis [9] . We also consider that saturation attack is one of the most powerful attacks against CLEFIA. In this analysis, we consider a 32-bit word based saturation attack. Let X i ∈ {0, 1} 32 (0 ≤ i < 2 32 ) be 2 32 32-bit variables. Now we classify X i into four states depending on the conditions satisfied.
Using the above notation, the following 6-round distinguishers are found.
These distinguishers can be extended to an 8-round distinguisher by adding two more rounds before the above 6 round path. Let A (96) be an "All" state of 96-bit word, and we divide it into 3 segments as A (96) = A 0 |A 1 |A 2 . Then the 8-round distinguishers are given as follows.
Using the above 8-round distinguisher, it turns out that 10-round 128-bit key CLEFIA can be attacked with complexity slightly less than 2 128 F-function calculations. From the above observations, we conclude that full-round CLEFIA has enough security margin against this attack.
Algebraic Attack [8] . Let CLEFIA-I be a modified version of CLEFIA by replacing all 4-bit S-boxes by the identity function I, I : {0, 1}
4 → {0, 1} 4 , where I(x) = x. Based on the estimation method by Courtois and Pieprzyk the total number of terms can be estimated as follows [8] . T = 81 . Although we give the results of the estimation, we should interpret these estimations with an extreme care: the real complexity of the XSL attacks is by no means clear at the time of writing and is the subject of much controversy [16, 20] .
Related-Key Attack [3] . As for CLEFIA with a 128-bit key, L is generated by L = GFN 4,12 (CON (128) , K). As in Table 2 , GFN 4,12 has at least 28 active S-boxes, and we have DCP max ≤ 2 −130.76 . Therefore, for any ∆K and ∆L, a differential probability of (∆K → ∆L) is expected to be less than 2 −128 , i.e., no useful differential (∆K → ∆L) exists.
Also for 192 and 256-bit keys, (L L , L R ) is generated by applying GFN 8,10 to K L , K R . From Table 2 , it has at least 29 differential active S-boxes, which implies there are no differential characteristics with probability more than 2 −128 . The above observations imply the probability of any related-key differential (∆P, ∆C, ∆K) is less than 2 −128 , if all the information on ∆L is needed for differential. Because all the bits in L are used in 2 or 6 consecutive rounds. As a result, we believe that CLEFIA holds strong immunity against relatedkey cryptanalysis. We also expect that CLEFIA holds enough immunity against other related-key type attacks including related-key boomerang and related-key rectangle attacks [5] . Security against Other Attacks. Due to the page limitation, the details of the security evaluation against known general attacks are omitted. Immunity against some of the known attacks can be estimated by the evaluation results of similar type attacks already mentioned in this section. We consider any attack does not threat full-round CLEFIA. Table 6 shows evaluation results of hardware performance of CLEFIA using a 0.09µm CMOS ASIC library, where one gate is equivalent to a 2-way NAND and the speed is evaluated under the worst-case condition. The Verilog-HDL models were synthesized by specifying area or speed optimization to a logic synthesis tool. The synthesized circuit of CLEFIA with 128-bit key by area optimization occupies only 5,979 gates at a throughput of about 1.60 Gbps. Although we take into account the difference of ASIC libraries, these figures indicate high efficiency of CLEFIA in hardware implementation compared to the best known results of hardware performance of AES [21] . Table 7 shows software performance results on Athlon 64 (AMD64) 4000+ 2.4 GHz processor running Windows XP 64-bit Edition. We measured software processing speed of enc/dec and key setup using the rdtsc instruction. In the single-block (common) implementation, 12.9 cycle/byte (1.48 Gbps on the processor) is achieved. The two-block parallel encryption is suitable for CTR mode, because two blocks can be processed simultaneously [18] .
Performance
Conclusion
We proposed a 128-bit blockcipher CLEFIA, which supports 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit keys. CLEFIA employs several new design approaches, including the DSM technique. As a result, enough immunity against known attacks is achieved. Moreover, the design of CLEFIA allows very efficient implementation in a variety of environments. Some results of highly efficient implementation are exemplified. 
